"Rethinking Democracy" By Carol Gould: First Thoughts On Reading

 It is a tragedy that this kind of political philosophy is so overlooked. Carol Gould is one of the few authors out there who takes democracy seriously enough to construct a theory from it, and yet her work is often missed when reviewing the literature. Despite the fidelity of Gould's work to the democratic project she barely makes it into the democracy entry on the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy except as a foot-note. In fact the theories of democracy that are touched on in the SEP are largely restricted to liberal, neo-liberal and aristo-monarchic positions.

So why has the work of Gould and her peers been so ignored?

Personally I think the problem lies with its ambigious classification and heritage. The arguments that Gould offers are too radical to fit in with the liberalism of Rawls and Dahl yet too reformist to be discussed alongside Anarchism. Furthermore, theories of participatory democratic theory are so multifaceted in terms of their origins that it is very difficult to slot them into one singular account of modern democratic theory, ergo they are often left out. 

Pragmatically speaking, this kind of book would be very informative for those interested in anarchism: in so far as it delineates an actual modus operandi for future "liberated territories". While Gould does retain both the state and the market as methods of organisation they are so augmented by the time she re-formulates them that they can barely be considered to be the kind of things that anarchists rail against. Her view of a democratic economy, for instance, largely mirrors anarcho-syndicalism (though it is never described in such terms) and her approach to governance consists of bottom up participatory structures. In short, the market that Gould wants is a socialist one and the territorial governance that she envisions needs little tweaking to defy conventional anarchist critiques.

It's not all one way traffic though. Gould's model of democracy could learn a few things from anarchism vis-a-vis institutional practises. Her vision of democratic participation, the actual making of decisions, seems to be focused on conversations followed by, what one would assume to be, a majority vote. Her theory's defence against majoritarian tyranny and persistent minorities is simply an appeal to the democratic character of its subjects. The anarchist tradition could offer here both a model of consensus decision making and an emphasis on decentralisation in order to build a more robust systemic response to the various upsets that can result from majority rule.

The social ontology and the ethical underpinnings of her theory remind me of Susan Neiman's "Why Grow Up?": at its core there's a really invigorating vision of humans as creative beings seeking self-betterment. In line with this, the book's content rests on a moral conception of self-determination as a requirement for human self-development. Gould rejects both liberal individualism and socialistic holism for an intermediate ontology that views humans as individuals whose identities are understood, pursued and realised through social relationships.


In terms of economic justice, this social ontology provides her with a twin pronged attack. If the purpose of freedom is self-development then this defends both "welfarism" and worker control of the means of production. "Welfarism" is justified on the grounds that everyone is entitled, where possible, to the resources that make self-development possible and the "rights to worker control" become justified where work is a social activity in which self-development takes place.

The book is strikingly comprehensive. "Rethinking Democracy" deals with topics as varied and concrete as the relationship between freedom and equality; the role of technical expertise in participatory democracy,  and the consequences Gould's theory has for debates surrounding global interventionism. If you want an idea of how anarchist principles might play out in a future society, but can't stand the more tendentious elements of anarchist rhetoric, then this is a worthwhile read.

"The Utopia of Rules" by David Graeber: First Thoughts on Reading

David Graeber has two distinct strengths: an ability to overturn common intuitions about everyday institutions and an extraordinarily affable rhetorical style. This book trades out on the latter in order to produce something a little more conceptually in depth. Accordingly, the book's primary thrusts are explicitly anarchist, heavy in theory and come with a social theory orientation that may make the books content too niche for Graeber's usual audience. Yet despite the denser prose The Utopia of Rules is a success that displays trenchant thoughtfulness on the topic of bureaucracy; to be clear, I'm not certain whether he's correct all of the time but he certainly is interesting.


Graeber's reason for writing a book on such a dull subject is given by the way of a hypothesises for why right wing movements often sequester the anti-establishment ticket in the face of left wing opposition. Graeber's contention is that left wing movements rarely produce a critique of bureaucracy, despite leftism being, according to Graeber, an anti-bureaucratic project. Such a reading of modern politics stands in stark contrast to more orthodox understandings of the topic. Since the soviet era onwards, political economy has often been thought of in terms of competing left wing desires for social justice and right wing desires for freedom. The respective drawbacks being either the brutality of right wing policy or the stifling bureaucracy of left wing institutions.

Advancing Graeber's account of leftism while overturning the above dichotomy he notes that bureaucracy has infested almost all organisations (not just the governmental) and that the roots and realities of bureaucracy run contrary to leftist ideals (humanism, pacifism, equality etc). Further development of this account sees Graeber make use of feminist theory. The feminist reading being that the function of bureaucracy is to provide tools for the powerful to monitor and control their subjects and that those in power generally do not need to understand their subordinates as said subordinates are often at the mercy of those in power. Ergo, the reason so much of our paperwork and protocol bears no resemblance to reality is that it is often in service to a power pre-occupied with controlling rather than assisting or understanding.

Graeber argues that alongside an avalanche of pointless paperwork, bureaucracy presents other more pernicious problems for the human race. In particular, it denies humans the possibility of organic social progress thereby crushing our libratory potential. It is when the lawyers turn up that a social movements death knell is properly wrung. In short, integrating social movements into a bureaucracy provides the people in charge with the ability to subsume anti-authoritarian movements; this little trick cajoles the group into conforming to the legal constraints of the very system that they intend to fight. For instance, a group of politically motivated squatters may successfully defend themselves from eviction and get the local council to grant them legal protection. But this legal protection requires the squatters to be integrated into a number of bureaucratic systems (such as regulatory housing bodies, land registries) which quickly force a hierarchy of signatories onto the squatters - both negating their anti-hierarchical modus operandi and leaving them at the behest of local governments and banks.

These restrictive outcomes of expanding bureaucracy are sometimes intended. Graeber makes note of figures such as George Gilder and Newt Gingrich: people who bureaucratised research projects with the aim of restricting the radical potential latent in the emergent technologies of yore. It is sections like these that leave me desiring  a more forward and visible referencing style. I'm sure there is plenty of truth to what Graeber says but these more conspiratorial sections would benefit from references being cited and discussed in the body of the text rather than just tacked on as annotations. 

 

It is not all doom and gloom however, Graeber, as promised in the book's blurb, offers up an explanation for why we secretly love bureaucracy. Articulating the idea that within bureaucracy is the romantic promise of a world operating by principles of impartiality and reason he concedes that there is something worth salvaging here. Graeber further emphasises that this utopian vision can be pursued without abandoning anarchist living arrangements. The often cited, and just as frequently misunderstood,  essay "The Tyranny of Structurelessness" is raised in aid of such a discussion.

It's hard for me to dislike almost anything that Graeber does. The neutral tone that he presents his arguments in and its infusion with his general warmth and good humour makes him a fantastic champion for anarchism: a movement often associated with dour nihilism. Finding myself soothed by the quality of his presentation I now question whether I can honestly critique him. To my star struck eyes this book is intelligent, comprehensive and novel: easily worth the money spent and time passed book in hand. My only real criticism is that in the aforementioned sections where "who did what" takes precedence over abstract social theory he risks sounding off like Noam Chomsky- allow me to elaborate. Chomsky, as a political writer, provides his audience with a horrifying vision of contemporary politics. His downfall is making of bold claims about U.S. foreign policy while supporting them with references that are rarely explicitly discussed in the text. Graeber teeters close to falling into the same trap of having his work appear a mite less credible than it would have been if he had discussed his sources more openly.

In fairness this book hasn't really garnered the hype that it deserves. The blurb of the book is dotted with quotes in praise of Graeber's earlier work Debt and this is generally not a good sign. I often hesitate to purchase books marketed in this way, taking it as an indication that this is the authors "problem child". Perhaps this is what has put others off the book but then again the subject matter is ostensibly boring which would make for a more likely explanation. Regardless an interesting, if niche, read. 

Vegetarianism: Is it Wrong to Keep Snakes?

Ethically speaking, vegetarians are better human beings and it's a shame I'm not one of them.

The meat industry is responsible for terrifying levels of food-waste, pollution and an overall contribution to animal suffering that is impossible to support in good conscience. Deep down we all know this. This barely acknowledged guilt is why non-vegetarians so frequently voice their petty gripes and quips about out-spoken vegetarians; this is despite "anti-vegetarians" generally being far more obnoxious and vocal. In short, we are guilty and we know it. Neither sneering t-shirt sloganism  nor panel show laddism will make this go away. When it comes to the moral question of vegetarianism, those healthy bastards have us cornered.

 I confess that I currently eat meat only because I like the taste of it: the ethical arguments have yet to overpower my appetite. This is a fairly common quandary for me: many of my moral failings emanate from a chasm between what I recognise intellectually and how I actually behave. I'm not a very rational person.

Anyway, enough self-flagellation...

Vegetarianism has obvious implications for one's dietary requirements and the ethical premises on which it is founded often leads one to veganism. That is to say that the kind of argumentation that inspires vegetarianism, whether it be animal rights or simple utility calculation, often demands refusing not just the ingestion of animal products but also the use of them in general.

Alongside the renouncement of leather-jackets is the question of pets. Can a vegan/vegetarian keep one? If you are of a moral rights strain then the answer is generally yes but within reason. If you are a utility focused ethicist then there is a little more wriggle room, but still a number of variables to account for.

How ethical is the pet-trade in hamsters et al? Are all hamster sellers morally equal or are there some who are morally preferable? What harms might be inflicted on a domesticated hamster and does it out-weigh the pains endured by not-existing?

More interesting is the question of carnivorous pets. I have kept snakes myself so I will use them as a somewhat racier case study than the more mundane, and probably more ethically concerning, example of cats.

 A snake lives only in virtue of other animals dying. Bearing this in mind, is the snake a moral effrontery to a decent minded vegetarian? Is the vegetarian obliged to kill it in order to save the other animals whose suffering is needed to feed the snake?

 If one had a moral rights inclination then the answers would probably be something to the tune of yes to the former and no to the latter. However, if one were more inspired by utilitarians such as Peter Singer then the question of killing the snake becomes more difficult to answer.  In closing, I don't have anything particularly deep or insightful to say; I'm just waiting to see an ALF activist torch a reptile store.

Resolutions 2015: Half Time Review

The cold post-winter of January is long behind me; nevertheless I am chained to its pact. Welcome to my half time review!

#1  Mo' Reading, Less Problems

A couple of months back I started reading Voltaire and realised, a bit late some would say, that you can often find two canons in one book. Continental philosophy often blurs genre lines with continental literature and this is both to its credit and detriment: the works tend to have greater cultural impact on account of their drama but sacrifice the veracity of their arguments in the process.

I have chosen to use the word "drama" rather than "readability" because while certain continentals can write fantastic fiction, their prose occasionally falls apart when writing straight laced philosophy.


For instance, in The Myth of Sisyphus Camu, for no discernible reason, behaves like the Oprah Winfrey of punctuation and hands every second word its own sub-clause despite being an otherwise very restrained and readable fiction writer.

Regardless, we are half way through the year of 2015 and I feel considerably more comfortable about my relationship with western literature. The journey is by no means at an end but I think I have good reason to hope that this year will end in satisfaction. If I continue the efforts I have made so far, I shouldn't have to play catch-up much longer.   

#2 Bad news for my cholesterol - I'm a lover not a fighter.

My health has deteriorated, slightly. My running has become infrequent and my diet unpredictable. There are two reasons for this, the first feeds into the second. I have made a number of romantic connections and I have also become more blasé with regards to my health. Consequently, I have spent more time getting drunk in bed with strange people than my doctor would of hypothetically recommended: evening runs and low fat yogurt have been replaced with rum, brie and cable ties.

Perhaps it is my, long awaited, attainment of a functional social life that has turned my attentions away from the rather solipsistic activities of calorie counting and mid-night jogging but I think a more honest appraisal involves holding myself accountable for recent complacencies.  I will try harder.

#3  Itunes - another wage-sucking vampire is now draining my current account.

Last time I wrote one of these posts my reticence and inability to scout out new artists was the one problem I had yet to fix. This time round it is the one I have had the most success with - thank you online shopping. When Steve Jobs returns from his cryo-chamber in the year 3011 he will be a little bit richer thanks to me; I have yet to decide how I feel about this.

The Problem with Public Intellectuals

Public intellectuals have a habit of presenting a false consensus. This is not a dig at the kinds of people who become public intellectuals; it's a problem with the way public intellectualism works.

Allow me to incriminate myself...


If I was to lecture you on the topic of moral philosophy for an hour then you may very well come away with the impression that moral rights, both natural and constructivist, are ridiculous. If however, you put an equally skilled defender of moral rights next to me you might come away with a somewhat more nuanced opinion. At the very least you wouldn't be led to believe that only fools and An-Caps trust in moral rights.

Managed by an intermediatary, any relationship between information and the public is open to abuse. Sometimes it can manifest as overt abuses that result from the intermediary refusing to acknowledge an argument, position or fact or sometimes as the more casual failure to give due credence to one's opponents. Such a problem is endemic to our culture of public intellectualism and is a good reason for seeking alternative methods of public education.

In my perfect world, universities, schools and the media would work to make the term "public intellectual" obsolete . To that effect, the training of academics in press relations and making more journals accessible to more people would be great steps forwards (though the latter probably isn't going to happen anytime soon). Offering young people educations that properly prepare them for participating in an intellectual culture would also be a fantastic measure to take. While modern educators are pushing for more emphasis on self-reliant learning and critical thinking, we need to cover a more academically practical curriculum.

Teaching young people not just about the subject matter that they are studying but also about how our knowledge of that subject matter is created and disseminated is vital to building an independent academic culture. If one wants to build a society where everyone can benefit from research, watch new developments and foster interests of their own then schools need to teach students these kinds of skillsets. Our educators must provide young people with knowledge about things like journal articles, peer-reviewal and meta-studies; even if people are not at a level where they can comperehend the content they should at least understand how it is produced. We don't expect a child to understand agriculture but we do teach them about where the chicken drumsticks they love come from: why can't we doing the same for science, economics and philosophy?

In closing I will admit that we do already have a rich and varied culture of public intellectuals. There are academics of every stripe bringing the most exciting and important aspects of their respective fields directly to our coffee tables. There is nothing ignoble about that. Indeed there are so many public intellectuals that if you don't like whoever is in vogue then with a little bit of digging you can easily find someone else. The problem is that for the most part, in my experience at least, people don't go digging; people largely engage with academic subjects as passive receptacles and wait to be filled in by public intellectuals. The problem of popularity and its obstruction of the quest for knowledge is nothing new but its effects can be mitigated by encouraging others to take up a more active and intimate relationship with the subjects that interest them. Until we have a pedagogical revolution in the field of public education I suppose the best we can do is recommend books and articles that are not on the best sellers list and diversify our debates. Let's just try not to be too smug when we recommend authors that people have "probably never heard of".